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Abstract The goal of this paper is to explain the meaning and distribution of
indefinites in comparatives, focusing on the case of English some and any and
German irgend-indefinites. We combine three competing theories of comparatives
with an alternative semantics of some and any, and a novel account of stressed
irgend-indefinites. One of the resulting theories, based on Heim’s (2006) analysis
of comparatives, predicts all the relevant differences in quantificational force, and
explains why free choice indefinites are licensed in comparatives.
Keywords: Indefinites, comparatives, intonational meaning
1 Introduction
The goal of this paper is to explain the meaning and distribution of indefinites in
comparatives. We will focus on the case of English any and some and German
irgend-indefinites.
(1) a. John is taller than (almost) anyone else in his class. ∀
b. John is taller than someone else in his class. ∃
c. Hans ist größer als IRGENDEIN Mitschüler in seiner Klasse. ∀
The data in (1) poses three puzzles. The first concerns the differences in quan-
tificational force: some receives an existential interpretation, while any receives a
universal interpretation. Stressed irgend-indefinites (small capitals indicate stress)
also receive a universal interpretation in comparatives (Haspelmath 1997: 245). If
irgendein is not stressed in (1-c), the sentence seems to receive a ‘specific unknown’
interpretation: John is taller than someone else from his class, the speaker doesn’t
know who.
The second puzzle concerns the licensing of any in (1-a). Since any can be
modified by almost here, it is arguably a free choice item rather than an NPI (Heim
2006: 20). FC-items have a restricted distribution. They are felicitous in possibility
statements, but need a post-nominal modifier to be felicitous in episodic sentences
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(licensing by a modifier is often called subtrigging since Dayal’s (1998) revival of
this term originally from LeGrand 1975).
(2) a. John may kiss any girl.
b. #John kissed any girl.
c. John kissed any girl with a red hat. subtrigging
There are several accounts of the facts illustrated in (2) (e.g. Dayal 1998; Giannaki-
dou 2001; Jayez & Tovena 2005; Menéndez-Benito 2005; Aloni 2007). However,
it is not known why FC-items are licensed in comparatives as well. Can any of the
existing accounts of FC indefinites be extended to the case of comparatives?
The third puzzle concerns irgend-indefinites. When unstressed, irgend-indefinites
have a free distribution, and in positive contexts they convey speaker ignorance.
(3) Irgend
irgend
jemand
somebody
hat
has
angerufen.
called
#Rat
guess
mal
prt
wer?
who?
‘Somebody called – speaker doesn’t know who’ (Haspelmath 1997)
When stressed, irgend-indefinites have meaning and distribution similar to any: they
are not licensed in episodic sentences, but they are licensed under negation, under
root modals and in comparatives (Port 2010); in the latter two cases they obtain
universal interpretations.
(4) Dieses Problem kann IRGEND JEMAND lösen.
‘This problem can be solved by anyone’ (Haspelmath 1997)
(5) Joan Baez sang besser als IRGEND JEMAND JE zuvor.
‘Joan Baez sang better than anyone ever before’ (Haspelmath 1997)
How can this be accounted for? And more specifically, what is the role of stress?
If indefinites are simply treated as existential quantifiers, traditional analyses of
comparatives (Seuren 1973; von Stechow 1984; Rullmann 1995), but also the more
recent account of Beck (2010) wrongly derive a universal reading for all examples
in (1). On the other hand, the analyses of Larson (1988) and Schwarzschild &
Wilkinson (2002) wrongly predict existential readings in all cases. Finally, the
analyses of Heim (2006), Schwarzschild (2004, 2008) and van Rooij (2008) manage
to derive both existential and universal meanings, but don’t have an obvious way of
predicting when and why we get which reading.
Our plan in this paper is as follows. In section 2 we consider three existing
theories of comparatives and we show that the contrast between sentences like (1-a)
and (1-b) is problematic for these theories, under the assumption that indefinites are
treated as existential quantifiers. In section 3 we specify a more sophisticated analysis
of indefinites in the framework of alternative semantics (Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002;
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Menéndez-Benito 2005), and in section 4 we integrate this treatment of indefinites
with the three accounts of comparatives discussed in section 2. In section 5, we
further enrich the theoretical apparatus in order to account for stressed irgend-
indefinites. One of the resulting theories, based on Heim’s (2006) account of
comparatives, will be able to deal with all the relevant data.
2 Three theories of comparatives
In this section we consider three theories of comparatives, which we take to be
representative of the most prominent approaches in the literature on comparatives.
I-theory. The first account of comparatives that we will consider is meant to
capture the insights and predictions of the traditional theories of Seuren, von Stechow
and Rullmann. On this account, plain comparatives are analyzed as follows:
(6) a. John is taller than Mary is.
b. λd. John is d tall ⊃ λd. Mary is d tall
The sentence is true iff the set of degrees d such that John is d tall includes the set
of degrees d such that Mary is d tall. This theory, which we will refer to as the
Inclusion Theory, or I-theory for short, predicts universal meanings for existentials
in the than-clause. This prediction is correct for any, but not for some.
(7) a. John is taller than any girl is.
b. λd. John is d tall ⊃ λd. some girl is d tall [ok]
(8) a. John is taller than some girl is.
b. λd. John is d tall ⊃ λd. some girl is d tall [wrong]
While existentials in than-clauses are predicted to get universal readings, universals
are predicted to get existential readings. This prediction is clearly problematic.
(9) a. John is taller than every girl is.
b. λd. John is d tall ⊃ λd. every girl is d tall [wrong]
To solve this problem the I-theory must assume that quantifiers (and some-indefinites)
scope out of than-clauses. This, however, is unexpected since than-clauses otherwise
behave like scope islands. The theories discussed below avoid this problem.
N-theory. The second theory we will consider is intended to capture the insights
and predictions of the account proposed by Schwarzschild (2008).1 One prominent
1 What we call the N-theory here corresponds to what Gajewski (2008) calls the Maximality theory.
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feature of this theory is that it assumes a negation operator within the than-clause.
We therefore refer to this theory as the Negation Theory, or N-theory for short. Plain
comparatives are analyzed as follows:
(10) a. John is taller than Mary is.
b. max(λd. John is d tall) ∈ λd. Mary is not d tall
Existential readings are now predicted for existentials in than-clauses, and universal
readings for universals.2
(11) a. John is taller than some girl is.
b. max(λd. John is d tall) ∈ λd. some girl is not d tall [ok]
(12) a. John is taller than every girl is.
b. max(λd. John is d tall) ∈ λd. every girl is not d tall [ok]
The universal interpretation of any-indefinites can be obtained in this theory by
assuming that any-indefinites take scope under negation:
(13) a. John is taller than any girl is. [ok]
b. max(λd. John is d tall) ∈ λd. it is not the case that some girl is d tall
Π-theory. The third theory we will consider is that of Heim (2006). We will
review this theory in somewhat more detail than the previous two; this will help in
understanding some of the arguments to be made later on. First of all, Heim assumes
that a simple comparative like (14-a) has (14-b) as its basic syntactic representation.
(14) a. John is taller than Mary is.
b. [John is [Π [-er than Mary is [Π /0] tall]] tall]
She further assumes that:
• tall is a relation between individuals and degrees of height, of type d(et):
[[tall]] = λd.λx. d ≤ x’s height
• -er is a relation between degrees, of type d(dt):
[[-er]] = λd.λd′. d′ > d
• than is a semantically vacuous operator of type (tt):
[[than]] = λ p. p
• /0 is a semantically vacuous operator of type ((dt)t)((dt)t):
2 Problems do arise with downward entailing quantifiers, see Gajewski (2008) for discussion.
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[[ /0]] = λQ(dt)t . Q
• Π is a relation between degree properties, of type (dt)((dt)t):
[[Π]] = λPdt .λQdt . P(max(Q))
The assumed Π operator distinguishes Heim’s theory most prominently from others.
We will therefore refer to this theory as the Π-theory. Heim assumes that the Π
operator “is generated in the degree-argument position of an adjective, where it
combines with whatever is traditionally generated in that slot” (Heim 2006: 14).
Given these assumptions, the basic syntactic representation of (14-a) in (14-b) is
uninterpretable, due to several type-mismatches. Heim assumes that this triggers a
sequence of movement operations. The complete derivation is given in (15)–(19).
At each stage we have underlined the constituent that undergoes movement, and the
types of the relevant traces and abstraction operators are given in subscript. We have
omitted the semantically vacuous lexical item than. The final structure is also given
in tree format in figure 1, with type specifications for all non-terminal nodes.
(15) [John is [Π [-er Mary is [Π /0] tall]] tall]
(16) [John is [Π [-er [Π /0] [λ1,d Mary is t1,d tall]]] tall]
(17) [John is [Π [-er [ /0 [λ2,dt [[Π t2,dt] [λ1,d Mary is t1,d tall]]]] ]] tall]
(18) [ /0 [λ2,dt [[Π t2,dt] [λ1,d Mary is t1,d tall]]]] [λ3,d [John is [Π [-er t3,d]] tall]]
(19) [ /0 [λ2,dt [[Π t2,dt] [λ1,d M is t1,d tall]]]] [λ3,d [[Π [-er t3,d]] [λ4,d J is t4,d tall]]]
Once this interpretable logical form is constructed by the appropriate movement
operations, the denotation of the sentence is computed as follows (henceforth, we
will use Π and er as an abbreviation of the meanings of Π and -er):
(20) John is taller than Mary is.
a. λP.[Π(P)(λd.T (m,d))](λd.Π(er(d))(λd′.T ( j,d′)))
b. λP.[P(max(λd.T (m,d)))](λd.er(d)(max(λd′.T ( j,d′))))
c. λd.[er(d)(max(λd′.T ( j,d′)))](max(λd.T (m,d)))
d. er(max(λd.T (m,d)))(max(λd′.T ( j,d′)))
e. max(λd′.T ( j,d′))> max(λd.T (m,d))
Thus, (14-a) is correctly predicted to be true just in case John’s height exceeds
Mary’s height. A parallel derivation also delivers the right truth-conditions for
comparatives with any-indefinites in the than-clause:
(21) John is taller than any girl is.
a. λP.[Π(P)(λd.∃x.(G(x)∧T (x,d)))](λd.Π(er(d))(λd′.T ( j,d′)))
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t
dt
t
dt
John is t4,d tallλ4,d
(dt)t
dt
t3,d-er
Π
λ3,d
(dt)t
(dt)t
t
dt
Mary is t1,d tallλ1,d
(dt)t
t2,dtΠ
λ2,dt
/0
Figure 1 The assumed logical form of (14-a) in the Π-theory.
b. max(λd′.T ( j,d′))> max(λd.∃x.(G(x)∧T (x,d)))
As desired, (21) is predicted to be true just in case John’s height exceeds the highest
degree to which at least one girl is tall. Finally, the Π theory is also able to derive
the right truth-conditions for comparatives with some or every in the than-clause.
However, this does require the additional assumption that these quantifiers are raised
to take scope over the Π operator. Below we give the semantic derivation for a
comparative with a some-indefinite in the than-clause. The assumed logical form is
displayed in figure 2. The case of every and other quantifiers is analogous.
(22) John is taller than some girl is.
a. λP.[λQ.[∃x.G(x)∧Q(x)](λx.Π(P)(λd.T (x,d)))](λd.Π(er(d))(λd′.T ( j,d′)))
b. λQ.[∃x.G(x)∧Q(x)](λx.Π(λd.er(d)(max(λd′.T ( j,d′))))(λd.T (x,d)))
c. λQ.[∃x.G(x)∧Q(x)](λx.er(max(λd.T (x,d)))(max(λd′.T ( j,d′))))
d. λQ.[∃x.G(x)∧Q(x)](λx.max(λd′.T ( j,d′))> max(λd.T (x,d)))
e. ∃x.G(x)∧max(λd′.T ( j,d′))> max(λd.T (x,d))
Thus, both in the N-theory and in the Π-theory, universal meanings of indefinites are
obtained by letting the indefinite scope under the relevant operator in the than-clause
(negation or Π, respectively), and existential meanings are obtained by letting the
indefinite scope over this operator. However, it is unclear why any should take
narrow scope, while some and every should take wide scope. We could follow Heim
(2006) and conjecture that scope is partly ‘determined by the need for NPIs to be
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t
dt
[λ3 [[Π [-er t3]] [λ4 [John is t4 tall]]]]]
(dt)t
(dt)t
t
et
t
[[Π t2] [λ1 [t5 is t1 tall]]]
λ5,e
some girl
λ2,dt
/0
Figure 2 The assumed logical form of (22) in the Π-theory.
licensed’ (Heim 2006: 21).3 That is, we could assume that indefinites and quantifiers
by default take scope over ¬/Π, but that NPIs violate this default rule in order to
be licensed. As we know, any has negative polarity uses, so one could argue that
this is why it must take scope under ¬/Π. However, this explanation would not
extend to FC-any and other free choice items like Italian qualunque or Spanish
cualquiera. These items occur in comparatives, with universal meaning (see (23)),
but are ungrammatical in negative contexts (see (24)), and therefore are not NPIs.
(23) Gianni è più alto di qualunque altro ragazzo della sua classe.
‘John is taller than any other boy from his class’
(24) #Nessuno ha baciato qualunque ragazzo.
‘Nobody has kissed any boy’
To summarize, in the N- and Π-theories, universal meanings of indefinites are
obtained by letting the indefinite scope under ¬/Π. However, this is unmotivated
for genuine FCIs. The I-theory accounts for universal readings of indefinites in
comparatives without stipulation. However, existential readings are not accounted
for at all by the I-theory. Below we will re-implement these theories of comparatives
in the framework of alternative semantics, and explore to what extent this resolves
3 Heim shows that Π, like negation, creates a DE environment, which presumably licenses NPIs.
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the encountered problems.
3 Indefinites in alternative semantics
Alternative semantics identifies the common meaning of various indefinite forms
as their potential to introduce sets of propositional alternatives. Their difference
in meaning and distribution derives from their necessary association with different
matching operators. Irgend-indefinites have been assumed to associate with the
existential propositional quantifier [∃] (Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002). We will make
the same assumption for English some. In the illustrations below, we will assume
that Sue and Mary are the only two girls in the relevant domain of quantification.
(25) a. Some / irgendein girl fell.
b. [∃] (some/irgendein girl fell)
c. [∃] Sue fell Mary fell
d. Predicted meaning: some girl fell.
FC items like FC-any have been assumed to associate with a universal propositional
quantifier [∀] and an exclusivity operator excl (Menéndez-Benito 2005; Menéndez-
Benito 2010; Aloni 2007). This licenses FC-any under3, and rules it out in episodic
contexts. The exclusivity operator is defined as follows:4
(26) For any φ of type (st): [[excl(φ)]] = {excl(α, [[φ ]]) | α ∈ [[φ ]]}
where: excl(α,A) = λw. w ∈ α and for all β ∈ A such that α 6⊂ β , w 6∈ β
To illustrate: if [[φ ]] = {Sue fell, Mary fell} then [[excl(φ)]] = {only Sue fell, only
Mary fell}. Crucially, excl delivers a set of mutually exclusive propositions. Thus,
applying [∀] immediately after excl, as in (27), yields a contradiction. In (28) the
modal operator ‘intervenes,’ which avoids the contradiction and delivers the desired
universal free choice meaning.
(27) a. #Any girl fell. ruling out FC-any in episodic contexts
b. [∀] excl (any girl fell)
c. [∀] only Sue fell only Mary fell ⇒ contradiction
(28) a. Any girl may fall. licensing FC-any under 3
b. [∀] 3 excl (any girl fall)
c. [∀] 3 only Sue falls 3 only Mary falls
d. Predicted meaning: for each girl it is possible that only she falls.
4 Roelofsen and van Gool’s (2010) analysis of alternative questions provides independent motivation
for this exclusiveness operator.
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4 Indefinites in comparatives
We will now implement the three theories of comparatives discussed above in
alternative semantics. In this framework, all expressions denote sets, mostly singleton
sets of traditional interpretations. We assume that semantic derivations make use of
point-wise function application and alternative-friendly predicate abstraction as in
Kratzer & Shimoyama (2002).5 Here are some of the assumed denotations:
(29) a. [[some girl]] = {m,s} b. [[tall]] = {λd.λx.λw.Tw(x,d)}
c. [[λi,d some girl is ti,d tall]] = {λd.λw.Tw(m,d),λd.λw.Tw(s,d), . . .}
4.1 The I-theory
To implement the I-theory of comparatives in alternative semantics we assume that
the comparative morpheme, -er, is an operator that takes two ‘intensional’ degree
properties, of type d(st), and delivers a proposition, of type (st).
(30) [[-er]] = {λPd(st).λQd(st).λw.[λd.Q(d,w)⊃ λd.P(d,w)]}
A plain comparative is then treated as follows (semantically vacuous operators are
omitted):
(31) a. John is taller than Mary is.
b. [-er [λ1,d Mary is t1,d tall]][λ2,d John is t2,d tall]
c. {λw.[λd.Tw( j,d)⊃ λd.Tw(m,d)]}
The sentence compares the set of degrees d such that John is d tall (the darkgray
column) with the set of degrees d such that Mary is d tall (the lightgray column).
Mary
John {d | John is d-tall}
{d |Mary is d-tall}
Next, consider a comparative with a some-indefinite in the than-clause.
(32) a. John is taller than some girl is.
5 As noticed by Kratzer and Shimoyama, the latter notion ‘does not quite deliver the expected set of
functions’, but a larger set including many ‘spurious’ functions. See Shan (2004) and Romero (2010)
for discussion of this issue, and possible refinements. In the representations below we will disregard
spurious functions; as far as we can see, they do not have impact on our predictions.
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b. [∃][-er [λ1,d some girl is t1,d tall]][λ2,d John is t2,d tall]
c. The set of worlds w such that at least one of the following holds:
{d | John is d-tall in w} ⊃ {d | Sue is d-tall in w}
{d | John is d-tall in w} ⊃ {d |Mary is d-tall in w}
d. ⇒ for some girl y, John is taller than y
We saw that in the conventional I-theory, some-indefinites had to scope out of the
than-clause in order to obtain an existential interpretation. In alternative semantics
this is no longer necessary: we get a wide scope effect for the indefinite via the
mechanism of propositional quantification, even though at the level of logical form
the indefinite stays in situ. The sentence is true iff the set of degrees d such that
John is d tall (the middle column in the diagram below) properly includes the set of
degrees such that the shortest girl is d tall, in this case Mary (the rightmost column).
Thus, an existential meaning is correctly predicted.
John
Mary
Sue {d | Sue is d-tall}
{d | John is d-tall}
{d |Mary is d-tall}
Finally, consider the case of any. We are assuming, following Menéndez-Benito
(2005, 2010) and Aloni (2007), that any associates with excl and [∀]. If moreover
we assume that the set of alternatives introduced by any girl does not only include
individual girls, like Sue and Mary, but also groups of girls, like Sue + Mary, then
the right truth-conditions are derived.
(33) a. John is taller than any girl is.
b. [∀][-er [λ1,d excl[any girl is t1,d tall]]][λ2,d John is t2,d tall]
c. The set of worlds w such that all of the following hold:
{d | John is d-tall in w} ⊃ {d | only Mary is d-tall in w}
{d | John is d-tall in w} ⊃ {d | only Sue is d-tall in w}
{d | John is d-tall in w} ⊃ {d | only Sue and Mary are d-tall in w}
d. ⇒ for every girl y, John is taller than y
The sentence is true iff the set of degrees to which John is tall (the leftmost, darkgray
column in the diagram on the next page) properly contains the set of degrees to
which only Sue is tall, the set of degrees to which only Mary is tall, and the set
of degree to which only Sue and Mary are tall (the lighter gray columns). Thus, a
universal meaning is correctly predicted.
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John
Mary
Sue
{d | John is d-tall}
{d | only Sue is d-tall}
{d | only Sue and Mary are d-tall}
{d | only Mary is d-tall}= /0
This means that the current implementation of the I-theory in alternative semantics
improves considerably on the conventional I-theory. In particular, the difference
in quantificational force between (1-a) and (1-b) is predicted, and the Menèndez-
Benito/Aloni account of FC-any under 3 is extended to the case of comparatives:
the comparative morpheme acts as a licensing ‘intervener,’ just like 3.
4.2 The N-theory
To implement the N-theory of comparatives in alternative semantics we again assume
that the comparative morpheme is an operator that takes two intensional degree
properties, of type d(st), and delivers a proposition, of type (st).
(34) [[-er]] = {λPd(st).λQd(st).λw.[max(λd.Q(d,w)) ∈ λd.P(d,w)]}
A plain comparative is analyzed as follows, with ¬ placed within the than-clause.
(35) a. John is taller than Mary is.
b. [-er [λ1,d ¬[Mary is t1,d tall]]][λ2,d John is t2,d tall]
c. {λw.[max(λd.Tw( j,d)) ∈ λd.Tw(m,d)]}
The sentence compares the maximal degree d such that John is d tall (the horizontal
line) with the set of degrees d such that Mary is not d tall (the lightgray column).
John
Mary {d |Mary is not d-tall}
Next consider a comparative with a some-indefinite in the than-clause:
(36) a. John is taller than some girl is.
b. [∃][-er [λ1,d some girl[λ3,e ¬[t3,e is t1,d tall]]]][λ2,d John is t2,d tall]
c. The set of worlds w such that at least one of the following holds:
29
Aloni and Roelofsen
max{d | John is d-tall in w} ∈ {d |Mary is not d-tall in w}
max{d | John is d-tall in w} ∈ {d | Sue is not d-tall in w}
d. ⇒ for some girl y, John is taller than y
In this case, the maximal degree to which John is tall (the horizontal line) is compared
with the set of degrees d such that Mary is not d tall, and the set of degrees d such
that Sue is not d tall (the two columns). The sentence is true iff the line cuts through
at least one of the columns. Thus, an existential reading is correctly derived.
John
Mary
Sue
{d |Mary is not d-tall}
{d | Sue is not d-tall}
We have assumed here that some, like ordinary quantifiers, scopes out of negation
(this is especially clear in the representation in (36-b)). However, it is important to
note that this assumption is not really necessary. If we had left some in situ, in the
scope of negation, we would have obtained exactly the same result.
We don’t have this liberty in the case of any. Here we have to leave any in the
scope of negation—otherwise wrong truth conditions obtain. Again, for this case we
have to assume a plural domain of individuals.
(37) a. John is taller than any girl is.
b. [∀][-er [λ1,d ¬[excl[any girl is t1,d tall]]]][λ2,d John is t2,d tall]
c. The set of worlds w such that all of the following hold:
max{d | John is d-tall in w} ∈ {d | not only Sue is d-tall in w}
max{d | John is d-tall in w} ∈ {d | not only Mary is d-tall in w}
max{d | John is d-tall in w} ∈ {d | not only S and M are d-tall in w}
d. ⇒ for every girl y, John is taller than y
John
Sue
Mary
{d | not only Sue is d-tall}
{d | not only Mary is d-tall}
{d | not only Sue and Mary are d-tall}
Thus, the N-theory can account for the licensing of any in comparatives, and for
the difference in quantificational force between some and any, but we do need to
stipulate that any takes scopes under negation.
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4.3 The Π-theory
To implement the Π-theory in alternative semantics we assume that the comparative
morpheme is an operator that takes two degree concepts, of type (sd), and delivers a
proposition, of type (st).
(38) [[-er]] = {λa.λa′.λw.[a′(w)> a(w)]}
Π now takes one argument of type (sd)(st) and another argument of type d(st), and
delivers a proposition of type (st).
(39) [[Π]] = {λP(sd)(st).λQd(st).P(λw.max(λd.Q(d,w)))}
A plain comparative, then, is analyzed as follows (in all representations below, t1
and t4 are of type d; t2 (and P) are of type (sd)(st); and t3 (and a) are of type (sd)).
(40) a. John is taller than Mary is.
b. [λ2[Π t2[λ1 M is t1 tall]]][λ3[Π[-er t3][λ4 J is t4 tall]]]
c. {λP.[Π(P)(λd.λw.Tw(m,d))](λa.[Π(er(a))(λd.λw.Tw( j,d))])}=
{λw.[max(λd.Tw( j,d))> max(λd.Tw(m,d))]}
Comparatives with some-indefinites get existential meanings, as desired. In the
representation below we take it that some scopes over Π, but the same result would
obtain if we took some to scope under Π.
(41) a. John is taller than some girl is.
b. [∃][λ2 some girl[λ5[Π t2[λ1 t5 is t1 tall]]]][λ3[Π[-er t3][λ4 J is t4 tall]]]
c. The set of worlds w such that at least one of the following holds:
max{d | John is d-tall in w}> max{d |Mary is d-tall in w}
max{d | John is d-tall in w}> max{d | Sue is d-tall in w}
d. ⇒ for some girl y, John is taller than y
In the case of any, scope w.r.t. Π does make a difference. Namely, if any takes scope
under Π, as in (42), we obtain the desired universal meaning, with Π intervening
between [∀] and excl, just like 3 in modal free choice constructions;6 on the other
hand, if any takes scope over Π, as in (43), we get a contradiction.
(42) a. John is taller than any girl is.
b. [∀][λ2[Π t2[λ1 excl[any girl is t1 tall]]]][λ3[Π[-er t3][λ4 J is t4 tall]]]
6 Again, we have to assume a plural domain of individuals here. Moreover, the max function needs to
be defined in such a way that max( /0) = 0. We could say, for instance, that for every set of degrees D,
max(D) is the minimal degree that is greater than or equal to every degree in D (this is usually called
the supremum of D). Then, indeed, max( /0) = 0.
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c. The set of worlds w such that all of the following hold:
max{d | John is d-tall in w}> max{d | only Sue is d-tall in w}
max{d | John is d-tall in w}> max{d | only Mary is d-tall in w}
max{d | John is d-tall in w}> max{d | only S and M are d-tall in w}
d. ⇒ for every girl y, John is taller than y
(43) a. John is taller than any girl is.
b. [∀][λ2excl[any girl[λ5[Π t2[λ1 t5 is t1 tall]]]]][λ3[Π[-er t3][λ4 J is t4 tall]]]
c. [∀]excl({λx.λw.[max(λd.Tw( j,d))>max(λd.Tw(x,d))]}([[any girl]]))
d. ⇒ contradiction, no intervention between excl and [∀]
The following table summarizes the merits of the three theories considered so far.
(44)
some any
I-theory yes yes
N-theory yes yes/no
Π-theory yes yes
All theories account for the contrast in quantificational force between (1-a) and
(1-b), and for the licensing of FC-any in comparatives. The N-theory, however,
overgenerates: without further stipulations, it predicts a reading for comparatives
with any that is not attested. In order to avoid this reading, we are forced to assume
that any has to take scope under negation. This assumption may be justified for
NPI uses of any, but not for FC-any and other free choice items that exhibit the
same behavior in comparatives. In the Π-theory we also have to assume that any
takes scope under Π, but in this case we have a ready explanation: the alternative
representation with any taking scope over Π yields a contradiction.
Thus, it seems fair to conclude at this point that the I-theory and the Π-theory
are the most promising theories. We now turn to irgend-indefinites.
5 Irgend-indefinites: the crucial role of accent
Kratzer & Shimoyama (2002) assume that irgend-indefinites, like some, associate
with [∃]. However, irgend-indefinites in comparatives can give rise to universal
readings, as exemplified in (1-c) in the beginning of the paper. How can such
universal readings be derived?
The crucial observation, we suggest, is that irgend-indefinites in comparatives
must be stressed in order to yield a universal reading (Haspelmath 1997). Inciden-
tally, the same is true for free choice uses of irgend-indefinites under modals, as was
illustrated in example (4) in the introduction.
We will assume that stress signals focus, and that focus has two semantic effects:
(i) it introduces a set of focus alternatives (Rooth 1985), and (ii) it flattens the
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ordinary alternative set (Roelofsen & van Gool 2010). Effect (i) allows us to derive
the free choice inferences of stressed irgend-indefinites under modals as obligatory
implicatures à la Chierchia (2010), and (ii) yields an account of stressed irgend in
comparatives. Let us have a closer look at the latter.
The flattening effect of focus is defined as follows (Roelofsen & van Gool 2010):
(45) a. If α is of type (st), then [[α]] is a set of propositions, and:
[[αF ]] = {⋃[[α]]}
b. If α is of type σ 6= (st), then:
[[αF ]] = {λ z.⋃y∈[[α]] z(y)}, where z is of type σ(st)
The first part of the definition, (45-a), specifies the effect of focus at the clausal level:
the alternative set for a focused clausal constituent αF consists of a single alternative,
which is the union of all the alternatives for α itself. In this sense, focus flattens
the alternative set. The second part of the definition extends this idea to sub-clausal
focused constituents. For illustration, consider the following two examples, both
involving an irgend-indefinite, one without focus, the other with.7
(46) Irgendjemand called.
a. Alternative set: {Mary called, Sue called, . . .}
b. Focus value: /0
(47) IrgendjemandF called.
a. Alternative set: {somebody called} [result of ‘flattening’]
b. Focus value: {Mary called, Sue called, . . .}
Here is the full derivation for the alternative set in (47-a) (where P is of type e(st)
and our domain consists only of people):
(48) [[irgendjemandF ]]([[called]]) = {λP.⋃y∈[[irgendjemand]]P(y)}({λx.λw.Cw(x)})
= {⋃y∈[[irgendjemand]]λw.Cw(y)} = {λw.∃y.Cw(y)}
If we assume that focus induces flattening of the alternative set we have a ready
account for the universal meaning of stressed irgend-indefinites in comparatives.
For the I-theory, the result is straightforward, for the N-theory and Π-theory we
need the extra assumption that irgend-indefinites always scope under negation or
7 Under these assumptions, focus also has a flattening effect on wh-pronouns and FCIs. In order to
derive the meaning of questions like WhoF called? we can assume, following Beck (2006), that
[[Q(A)]] = focus-value(A), rather than [[Q(A)]] = [[A]]. As for stressed FCIs, we would have to rely on
(obligatory) implicatures to derive the correct interpretation of sentences like John may kiss anybodyF .
The application of [∀] would be vacuous in this case (thanks to Luka Crnicˇ for this observation).
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the Π operator. Stressed irgend-indefinites are arguably NPIs (felicitous in DE
contexts, but out in episodic sentences), so this scopal behavior follows from Heim’s
conjecture. Note however that (stressed) irgend-indefinites are ungrammatical under
sentential negation (Angelika Kratzer, p.c.). This could be considered an additional
argument favoring the Π-theory over the N-theory.
(49) I-theory
a. John is taller than IRGENDJEMANDF is.
b. [∃][-er [λ1,d irgendjemandF is t1,d tall]][λ2,d John is t2,d tall]
c.
⋃{λw.[λd.Tw( j,d)⊃ λd.∃x.Tw(x,d)]}
d. ⇒ for every person x, John is taller than x
(50) N-theory
a. John is taller than IRGENDJEMANDF is.
b. [∃][-er [λ1,d¬[irgendjemandF is t1,d tall]]][λ2,d John is t2,d tall]
c.
⋃{λw.[max(λd.Tw( j,d)) ∈ λd.¬∃x.Tw(x,d)]}
d. ⇒ for every person x, John is taller than x
(51) Π-theory
a. John is taller than IRGENDJEMANDF is.
b. [∃][λ2[Π t2[λ1excl[irgendjemandF is t1 tall]]]][λ3[Π[-er t3][λ4 J is t4 tall]]]
c.
⋃{λw.[max(λd.Tw( j,d))> max(λd.∃x.Tw(x,d))]}
d. ⇒ for every person x, John is taller than x
The question that arises next is what happens if we stress someone in a than-clause?
Even if stressed, some-indefinites never yield a universal interpretation.
(52) a. John is taller than IRGENDJEMANDF is. [universal meaning]
b. John is taller than SOMEONEF is. [existential meaning]
The I-theory cannot distinguish between these two cases, and makes the wrong
predictions for (52-b). The N-theory and the Π-theory do make the right predictions,
under the assumption that someone scopes over negation and Π respectively.
(53) I-theory
a. John is taller than SOMEONEF is.
b. [∃][-er [λ1,d someoneF is t1,d tall]][λ2,d John is t2,d tall]
c.
⋃{λw.[λd.Tw( j,d)⊃ λd.∃x.Tw(x,d)]}
d. ⇒ for every person x, John is taller than x [wrong]
(54) N-theory
a. John is taller than SOMEONEF is.
b. [∃][-er [λ1,d someoneF [λ3,e¬[t3,e is t1,d tall]]]][λ2,d John is t2,d tall]
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c.
⋃{λw.[max(λd.Tw( j,d)) ∈ (λd.∃x.¬Tw(x,d))]}
d. ⇒ for at least one person x, John is taller than x [ok]
(55) Π-theory
a. John is taller than SOMEONEF is.
b. [∃][λ2 someoneF [λ5[Π t2[λ1 t5 is t1 tall]]]][λ3[Π[-er t3][λ4 J is t4 tall]]]
c.
⋃{λw.∃x.[max(λd.Tw( j,d))> max(λd.Tw(x,d))]}
d. ⇒ for at least one person x, John is taller than x [ok]
Thus, the predictions of the three theories are summarized in the following table:
(56)
some any IRGEND SOME
I-theory yes yes yes no
N-theory yes yes/no yes/no yes
Π-theory yes yes yes yes
The I-theory wrongly predicts universal meaning for stressed some in comparatives.
The predictions of the N-theory are correct but rely on the assumption that while
some has to scope out of negation, FC any and irgend-indefinites must scope under
negation. This assumption is unjustified: it is unclear why FCIs should scope under
negation, and it is unnatural to assume that irgend-indefinites scope under negation
since they are ungrammatical under sentential negation.
The Π theory is most satisfactory: some (like ordinary quantifiers) must take
scope over Π, while stressed irgend-indefinites must take scope under Π because
they are NPIs and, as shown by Heim (2006), Π creates a downward entailing
environment. Finally, FC-any and other genuine free choice items must scope under
Π, because they would otherwise yield a contradiction.
We would like to conclude this section by briefly mentioning another possible
way of implementing Heim’s theory in an alternative semantics. This implemen-
tation employs Aloni’s (2007) notion of exhaustification, exh, which generalizes
Menéndez-Benito’s excl operator in order to account for subtrigging cases (see
example (2-c)). In the Π-theory formulated above, the excl operator triggered by
FC-any occurs in the scope of the operator max, which is introduced as part of the
meaning of Π (see example (42)). The central idea behind the alternative imple-
mentation would be to employ the operator exh, which can not only be seen as a
generalization of excl but also of max. We would assume, then, that: (i) comparatives
employ exh in their logical form (cf. Jacobson 1995; Beck 2010) rather than max
in their semantics (Π is now of type ((sd)(st))((sd)(st)), and again semantically
vacuous operators are omitted):
(57) a. John is taller than Mary is.
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b. [λ2[Π t2[exh[λ1 M is t1 tall]]]][λ3[Π [-er t3] [exh[λ4 J is t4 tall]]]]
and (ii) any requires the application of exh, rather than excl, as in Aloni (2007):
(58) [∀] . . .exh . . . any . . .
FCIs are then licensed in comparatives precisely because comparatives employ
the operator that FCIs are dependent on. Furthermore we have a straightforward
explanation of why FCIs must take narrow scope in comparative clauses, otherwise
they would fall out of the scope of their licensing operator exh.
(59) John is taller than any girl is.
a. [λ2[Π t2[exh[λ1 any girl is t1 tall]]]][λ3[Π[-er t3] [exh[λ4 J is t4 tall]]]]
b. # [λ2[ any girl [λ5[Π t2[exh[λ1 t5 is t1 tall]]]]]][λ3[Π[-er t3] [exh[λ4 J is t4 tall]]]]
This alternative implementation of Heim’s theory seems to give us essentially the
same overall predictions as the Π-theory presented above. A proper comparison
between the two analyses must be left for another occasion.
6 Conclusion
We have explored the meaning and distribution of indefinites in comparatives, focus-
ing on English some and any, and German irgend-indefinites. We considered three
theories of comparatives, and showed that all these theories encounter certain prob-
lems if indefinites are simply treated as existential quantifiers. We re-implemented
the three theories in the framework of alternative semantics (Kratzer & Shimoyama
2002), where indefinites are treated as introducing propositional alternatives. This
allowed us to extend the Menèndez-Benito/Aloni account of free choice indefinites
under modals to the case of comparatives.
The move to alternative semantics also allowed us to formulate a new account
of the semantic contribution of stress/focus. Following Roelofsen & van Gool
(2010), we assumed that focus flattens the alternative set (besides introducing focus
alternatives). This effect plays a crucial role in the interpretation of stressed irgend-
indefinites in comparatives.
Finally, we found that Heim’s (2006) theory of comparatives, re-implemented in
alternative semantics and extended with our theory of focus, suitably accounts for
the observed variability in quantificational force. Other theories do not seem to
be able to account for the full range of observations without further stipulations.
36
Indefinites in Comparatives
References
Aloni, Maria. 2007. Free choice and exhaustification: an account of subtrigging
effects. In Estela Puig-Waldmueller (ed.), Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung
11, Barcelona: Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
Beck, Sigrid. 2006. Intervention effects follow from focus interpretation. Natural
Language Semantics 14. 1–56.
Beck, Sigrid. 2010. Quantifiers in than-clauses. Semantics and Pragmatics 3. 1–72.
Chierchia, Gennaro. 2010. Meaning as an Inferential System: Polarity and Free
Choice Phenomena. Unpublished manuscript.
Dayal, Veneeta. 1998. Any as inherently modal. Linguistics and Philosophy 21.
433–476.
Gajewski, Jon. 2008. More on quantifiers in comparative clauses. In T. Friedman &
S. Ito (eds.), Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Theory XVIII, 340–357.
Giannakidou, Anastasia. 2001. The meaning of free choice. Linguistics and Philos-
ophy 24. 659–735.
Haspelmath, Martin. 1997. Indefinite pronouns. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Heim, Irene. 2006. Remarks on comparative clauses as generalized quantifiers.
Unpublished manuscript.
Jacobson, Pauline. 1995. On the quantificational force of English free relatives.
In Emmon Bach, Eloise Jelinek, Angelika Kratzer & Barbara Partee (eds.),
Quantification in natural language, Kluwer.
Jayez, Jacques & Lucia M. Tovena. 2005. Free choiceness and individuation.
Linguistics and Philosophy 28. 1–71.
Kratzer, Angelika & Junko Shimoyama. 2002. Indeterminate pronouns: The view
from Japanese. In Y. Otsu (ed.), The proceedings of the Third Tokyo Conference
on Psycholinguistics, 1–25. Tokyo (Hituzi Syobo).
Larson, Richard. 1988. Scope and comparatives. Linguistics and Philosophy 11.
1–26.
LeGrand, J.E. 1975. Or and any: The semantics and syntax of two logical operators:
University of Chicago dissertation.
Menéndez-Benito, Paula. 2005. The grammar of choice: University of Massachusetts
Amherst dissertation.
Menéndez-Benito, Paula. 2010. On universal Free Choice items. Natural Language
Semantics 18. 33–64.
Port, Angelika. 2010. Epistemic specificity and knowledge. Talk given at the
workshop ‘Indefiniteness Crosslinguistically’ (DGfS), Berlin, February 2010.
Roelofsen, Floris & Sam van Gool. 2010. Disjunctive questions, intonation, and
highlighting. In Maria Aloni, Harald Bastiaanse, Tikitu de Jager & Katrin Schulz
(eds.), Logic, language and meaning, Springer.
37
Aloni and Roelofsen
Romero, Maribel. 2010. Alternative-based semantics combined with movement: the
role of presupposition. Talk at the ‘Workshop on Alternative-Based Semantics’,
University of Nantes (France). October 29-30, 2010.
van Rooij, Robert. 2008. Comparatives and quantifiers. In Olivier Bonami &
Patricia Cabredo Hofherr (eds.), Empirical issues in Syntax and Semantics 7,
CSSP.
Rooth, Mats. 1985. Association with focus: University of Massachusetts Amherst
dissertation.
Rullmann, Hotze. 1995. Maximality in the semantics of wh-constructions: University
of Massachusetts Amherst dissertation.
Schwarzschild, Roger. 2004. Scope splitting in the comparative. MIT Colloquium.
Schwarzschild, Roger. 2008. The semantics of comparatives and other degree
constructions. Language and Linguistics Compass 2. 308–331.
Schwarzschild, Roger & Karina Wilkinson. 2002. Quantifiers in comparatives: A
semantics of degree based on intervals. Natural Language Semantics 10. 1–41.
Seuren, Pieter. 1973. The comparative. In Ferenc Kiefer & Nicolas Ruwet (eds.),
Generative grammar in Europe, Reidel.
Shan, Chung-Chieh. 2004. Binding alongside Hamblin alternatives calls for variable-
free semantics. In Kazuha Watanabe & Robert B. Young (eds.), Proceedings
from Semantics and Linguistic Theory XIV, Cornell University Press.
von Stechow, Arnim. 1984. Comparing semantic theories of comparatives. Journal
of Semantics 3. 1–77.
Maria Aloni
ILLC/Dept. of Philosophy
University of Amsterdam
Science Park 904
1098 XH Amsterdam
m.d.aloni@uva.nl
Floris Roelofsen
ILLC/Dept. of Philosophy
University of Amsterdam
Science Park 904
1098 XH Amsterdam
f.roelofsen@uva.nl
38
